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Jamming Suppression in Massive MIMO Systems
Hossein Akhlaghpasand, Emil Björnson, and S. Mohammad Razavizadeh
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a framework for protecting the uplink transmission of a massive multiple-
input multiple-output (mMIMO) system from a jamming attack. Our framework includes a novel
minimum mean-squared error based jamming suppression (MMSE-JS) estimator for channel training
and a linear zero-forcing jamming suppression (ZFJS) detector for uplink combining. The MMSE-JS
exploits some intentionally unused pilots to reduce the pilot contamination caused by the jammer. The
ZFJS suppresses the jamming interference during the detection of the legitimate users’ data symbols.
The implementation of the proposed framework is practical, since the complexities of computing the
MMSE-JS and the ZFJS are linear (not exponential) with respect to the number of antennas at the
base station and linear detectors with the same complexities as the ZFJS have been already fabricated
using 28 nm FD-SOI (Fully Depleted Silicon On Insulator) technology in [12] and Xilinx Virtex-7
XC7VX690T FPGA in [13] for the mMIMO systems. Our analysis shows that the jammer cannot
dramatically affect the performance of a mMIMO system equipped with the combination of MMSE-JS
and ZFJS. Numerical results confirm our analysis.
Index Terms
Massive MIMO, jamming suppression.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (mMIMO) is the key technology to increase the spec-
tral efficiency (SE) in future wireless networks [1], [2], by spatial multiplexing of many users.
Robustness against jamming attacks is an important requirement that future networks must fulfill.
Jamming detection is the first step to improve security [3], while jamming suppression is the
next step [4]−[8]. In [4], two anti-jamming schemes are proposed for an interference alignment
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2(IA)-based wireless network with perfect channel state information and cooperation between
the transmitters and receivers, while in [5], exploiting jamming signals for energy harvesting
is also considered in such a network to take benefit from the jammer. In [6], a subspace-based
approximate minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) detector is used to filter out uplink jamming,
but it breaks down when the jammer uses the same power as the legitimate users. Since mMIMO
is sensitive to jamming pilot contamination, in [7], the downlink transmission is secured by
assigning multiple orthogonal pilots to each user and randomly selecting which to transmit. Do
et al. [8] proposed to estimate the jammer channel and use it for zero-forcing (ZF)-like uplink
detection. The jamming channel is estimated by exploiting unused pilots and pilot hopping, to
“force” the jammer to transmit these unused pilots to cause pilot contamination. We will improve
on this prior work by supporting multiple legitimate users and using the unused pilots in a more
efficient way to achieve higher SE.
The severe threats imposed by jamming attacks during the uplink transmission of the mMIMO
systems motivated us to study the jamming suppression problem. The main contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
• We suggest a new uplink framework based on a zero-forcing jamming suppression (ZFJS)
detector, which uses the channels of both the legitimate users and jammer to suppress
jamming.
• We propose an MMSE based jamming suppression (MMSE-JS) estimator that exploits
unused pilots to provide the estimated channels of both the legitimate users and jammer
for implementation of ZFJS.
• We exploit asymptotic properties of mMIMO to acquire the channel statistics and utilize
pilot hopping to reduce the jamming pilot contamination in order to get accurate channel
estimations.
Our analytical and numerical analyses show that using the proposed framework, the jammer
cannot dramatically affect SE of the system.
Notations: The conjugate, transpose, and conjugate transpose of an arbitrary matrix X are
respectively denoted by X∗, XT , and XH , while IN is the N × N identity matrix. We denote the
Euclidean norm of an arbitrary vector x by ‖x‖. The magnitude and angle of a complex value x
are denoted by |x | and ∠x, respectively. E{x} is the expectation of a stochastic vector x. Finally,
Var{x} , E{|x − E{x}|2}.
3Fig. 1: Uplink transmission of a mMIMO system under jamming attack.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the uplink of a single-cell mMIMO system, depicted in Fig. 1, consisting of
one M-antenna base station (BS) and K single-antenna legitimate users in the presence of a
jammer. For brevity, we consider the single-cell scenario, which is similar to a practical multi-
cell scenario with a pilot reuse factor 3, 4, or 7. We assume a single-antenna jammer in order
to analyze the main principle of jamming suppression within the limited space. We denote by
hk ∈ CM×1 and hw ∈ CM×1 the channel vectors from the kth user and the jammer to the BS,
respectively, which are modeled by hk ∼ CN (0, βkIM) and hw ∼ CN (0, βwIM). The coefficients
βk and βw represent the large-scale fading. We study a block-fading model where the channels
are constant within a coherence block of T samples and have independent realizations between
the blocks.
The BS needs to estimate the channel vectors of the users under interference/noise in each
coherence block. Hence, the users transmit their mutually orthonormal pilots at τ (τ ≤ T) samples
of a coherence block. The pilots are selected from an orthonormal pilot set and assigned to the
users by the BS. We denote the pilot of the kth user by φ
(U)
k
∈ Cτ×1 and the orthonormal pilot
set by {φ1, . . . , φτ}, where φi ∈ Cτ×1 is the ith pilot. During the remaining T − τ samples, the
users transmit data symbols to the BS. The transmit powers of the users are denoted by pt and
pd in the pilot and data phases, respectively. The jammer transmits intentional interference in
the pilot and data phases by different transmit powers qt and qd, respectively, in order to reduce
the performance of the legitimate system.
4A. Pilot Phase
During τ samples of a coherence block, the users transmit their allocated pilots to the BS.
The received signal Yt ∈ CM×τ at the BS is given by
Yt =
√
τpt
K∑
i=1
hiφ
(U)T
i
+
√
τqthwψ
T
w
+ Nt, (1)
where ψw ∈ Cτ×1 is a normalized (unit power) sequence which is transmitted by the jammer
and Nt ∈ CM×τ is the normalized receiver noise composed of i.i.d CN(0, 1) elements. Since
ψw might be a random vector, the second term in the right-hand side of (1) is not necessarily
Gaussian. Hence, we use the linear MMSE (LMMSE) estimate of hk based on Yt which takes
the following form [9, Ch. 12]:
hˆk =
√
τpt βk
1 + τqt E
{α(U)k 2} βw + τpt βk y
(U)
k
, (2)
where α
(U)
k
, ψT
w
φ
(U)∗
k
and y
(U)
k
, Ytφ
(U)∗
k
. To implement the LMMSE, we need Mτ+7 complex
multiplications.
B. Data Phase
During data transmission, the normalized complex symbols xi and xw are simultaneously
transmitted by the ith user and jammer. The received vector yd ∈ CM×1 at the BS is
yd =
√
pd
K∑
i=1
hi xi +
√
qdhwxw + nd, (3)
where nd ∼ CN (0, IM) is the normalized receiver noise. The BS filters the data signal yd by
using a combining matrix V ∈ CM×K , i.e., the receive combining matrix based on the channel
estimates, to obtain VHyd.
Lemma 1. (Asymptotic SE): In a mMIMO system utilizing the LMMSE estimate in (2) and
a standard linear detector V (e.g., matched filter (MF) or ZF), if the probability of α
(U)
k
= 0 is
non-zero, then the achievable SE of the kth user goes to infinity as M → ∞; otherwise if the
probability of α
(U)
k
= 0 is zero, then we get the asymptotic SE of the kth user as
S(asy)
k
=
(
1 − τ
T
)
E
log2
©­­«1 +
pt pdβ
2
k
qtqd
α(U)
k
2 β2w
ª®®¬
 , M →∞. (4)
5Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
Since in the mMIMO systems, the asymptotic SE tends to infinity, an effective jammer tries
to limit the asymptotic SE in (4) (or even makes it to be zero). The necessary condition to
achieve this goal is that α
(U)
k
is always non-zero. Moreover, in a special worst-case situation,
a jammer may have access to the pilot assigned to a particular user and attack that user (e.g.,
the kth user). In this case, the jammer selects |α(U)
k
|2 = 1. However, this is not the case that
happens in reality due to that in a hostile environment, the BS knows such a jammer attacks
the pilot phase, thus it uses a pseudo-random pilot hopping technique to assign pilots to the
users at the beginning of each coherence block as a counter strategy [11, Sec. V]. Therefore,
the jammer cannot immediately estimate which pilot is assigned to the target user nor exactly
transmit the same pilot at each instant. Anyway, we assume that the jammer is smart so that it
knows the transmission protocol and the pilot set {φ1, . . . , φτ}. A smart jammer can be aware
of this information by listening to the channel for some consecutive coherence blocks.
Remark 1. In a mMIMO system, the main aim of a jammer can be to limit the asymptotic SE
of a system or a particular user. Since the jammer cannot know which pilot is currently used
by the target user, to ensure effective attacking, it selects ψw such that the inner product of ψw
and each φi in the pilot set is always non-zero. The jammer needs to spread its power over
all pilots, i.e., 0 < E{|ψT
w
φ∗
i
|2} < 1, i = 1, . . . , τ, to make the probability of α(U)
k
= 0 to be
zero. Prior works assume that the jammer divides its average power equally over all pilots, i.e.,
E{|ψT
w
φ∗
i
|2} = 1/τ, that guarantees any jamming sequence is probabilistically equally good [8],
[11].
Example: An example of a jammer strategy that satisfies above description is
ψw ∼ CN
(
0,
1
τ
Iτ
)
. (5)
We can compute
E
{ψT
w
φ∗i
2}
=
1
τ
, (6)
because the pilots are normalized, i.e., φT
i
φ∗
i
= 1. The probability of ψT
w
φ∗
i
= 0 is zero, since ψw is
a continuous random vector, which is uniformly distributed over the unit sphere. 
The number of pilots is fixed in practice, while the number of users vary and is usually less
than τ. Hence, there are generally τ − K ≥ 1 unused pilots which can be exploited to improve
6the security.
III. JAMMING SUPPRESSION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose the MMSE-JS estimator as the first step of our framework. Then,
we use a ZFJS detector for next step and mathematically analyze the SE of the system.
A. MMSE-JS Estimator
To simplify the notation, we assume without loss of generality that pilots used in one coherence
block are numbered such that the first K pilots are assigned to the users and the remaining pilots
are unused. The received signal in (1) is rewritten as
Yt =
√
τpt
K∑
i=1
hiφ
T
i +
√
τqthwψ
T
w
+ Nt . (7)
Since the signals received along the unused pilots include only the jamming signal (and noise),
we exploit them to estimate the jammer’s channel and improve the estimation of the users’
channels. By projecting Yt on each of the unused pilots, we have
yi = Ytφ
∗
i =
√
τqtαihw + ni, i = K + 1, . . . , τ, (8)
where αi , ψ
T
w
φ∗
i
and ni = Ntφ
∗
i
∼ CN(0, IM). The MMSE-JS estimate of the jammer’s effective
channel h˜wi ,
√
τqtαihw based on yi, which is derived from MMSE estimation [9, Ch. 11], is
ˆ˜hwi =
Ji
1 + Ji
yi =
√
τqtαiJi
1 + Ji
hw +
Ji
1 + Ji
ni, (9)
where Ji , τqt |αi |2 βw. The estimation error in this case is calculated as ε˜wi = ˆ˜hwi − h˜wi ,
where ε˜wi is independent of
ˆ˜hwi and ε˜wi ∼ CN
(
0,
Ji
1+Ji IM
)
. Although Ji is unknown by the
system, we will later show that it can be estimated using the asymptotic behaviour of mMIMO
systems. We have τ −K estimated versions of jammer’s effective channels ˆ˜hwi, i = K +1, . . . , τ,
therefore we select the one that has the lowest normalized estimation error, i.e., ε˜
(n)
wi
,
ε˜wi√
τqtαi
.
Hence, the estimated effective channel of the jammer is obtained as ˆ˜h⋆
w
=
Joyo
1+Jo where the
subscript o = argmax
i
{Ji}. The related estimation error is denoted by ε˜⋆w. On the other hand,
the projection of Yt on the kth user’s pilot sequence is
yk = Ytφ
∗
k =
√
τpthk +
√
τqtαkhw + nk, (10)
7where αk , ψ
T
w
φ∗
k
and nk = Ntφ
∗
k
∼ CN (0, IM). We want to estimate the channel of the kth user
based on yk . To decrease the pilot contamination caused by the jammer, we need to suppress
the jammer’s term in (10). To this end, we exploit one of the received signals on the unused
pilots. We select this signal from (8) and denote it by yk¯ . The MMSE-JS estimate of the kth
user’s channel based on yk and yk¯ is
hˆk =
√
τptβk
1 + δ2
k
+ τpt βk
(
yk − δke jθkyk¯
)
=
τpt βk
1 + δ2
k
+ τptβk
hk +
√
τpt βk
1 + δ2
k
+ τpt βk
(
nk − δke jθknk¯
)
,
(11)
where δk ,
αkα
k¯
 and θk , ∠αk − ∠αk¯ . The estimation error is independent of hˆk and given by
εk ∼ CN
(
0,
(1+δ2
k
)βk
1+δ2
k
+τpt βk
IM
)
. The BS does not know δk and θk , but it can estimate them using
the asymptotic mMIMO behaviors, as shown next.
B. Asymptotic Estimates
To implement MMSE-JS, the BS needs to know the variables Ji, i = K + 1, . . . , τ and
δk, θk, k = 1, . . . , K , which are generated randomly by the jammer. Recall that the subscript k¯
in the definition of δk and θk refers to the received signal on the unused pilot selected from (8)
to suppress the jammer’s pilot contamination from the estimate of the kth user’s channel.
Theorem 1. In mMIMO systems, Ji can be estimated by
Ji =
[
‖yi‖2
M
− 1
]
+
, i = K + 1, . . . , τ, M →∞, (12)
where yi is the received signals in (8), and [x]+ , max(0, x) for x ∈ R. In addition, δk, θk are
obtained as
δk =

√√ [ ‖yk ‖2
M
−τpt βk−1
]
+
‖yk¯ ‖2
M
−1
,
‖yk¯‖2
M
> 1,
0,
‖yk¯‖2
M
≤ 1,
M → ∞, (13)
θk = ∠
yH
k¯
yk
M
, M → ∞, (14)
for k = 1, . . . , K following the received signal on the kth user’s pilot yk in (10) as well as yk¯
from (8).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. 
8The number of complex multiplications required to implement the MMSE-JS is M (3τ + 4)+
16, which is linear with respect to M and τ (similar to the complexity of the LMMSE). Hence,
the implementation of the MMSE-JS is practical.
C. ZFJS Detector
We exploit ZFJS based on the estimated channels of the users hˆk, k = 1, . . . , K and the
estimated channel of the jammer ˆ˜h⋆
w
. The ZFJS is defined as V , H(HHH)−1, where H ,
[hˆ1, . . . , hˆK, ˆ˜h⋆w] ∈ CM×(K+1) and M > K + 1. We null the interference caused by the jammer and
also other users using the ZFJS detector. The number of complex multiplications for computing
the ZFJS is M(K + 1)2 + ((K + 1)3 − (K + 1))/3 as well as the linear detectors with the same
complexities as the ZFJS have been already fabricated using 28 nm FD-SOI (Fully Depleted
Silicon On Insulator) technology in [12, Sec. V] and Xilinx Virtex-7 XC7VX690T FPGA in
[13, Sec. VI] for M = 128 and K = 8.
Lemma 2. Using ZFJS method based on the channels estimated by MMSE-JS, the achievable
SE of the kth user is
Sk =
(
1 − τ
T
)
E
{
log2 (1 + ρk)
}
, (15)
where ρk the effective SINR of the kth user is given by
ρk =
pd
Var
{√
pd
∑K
i=1 v
H
k
εi +
√
qd
Jov
H
k
ε˜⋆
w
αk} + E {‖vk ‖2 αk} , (16)
and vk is the kth column of the ZFJS matrix V.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. 
Corollary 1. For τ ≥ 2K + 1, the SINR in (16) becomes
ρk =
τptpdβ
2
k
1+δ2
k
+τpt βk
(M − K − 1)∑K
i=1
pd(1+δ2i )βi
1+δ2
i
+τpt βi
+
qd
1+Jo + 1
. (17)
Proof: When τ ≥ 2K + 1, we can use different yk¯ in (11) for all users and also a
different yo for the jammer, therefore the estimation errors are mutually independent. Hence,
Var{√pd
∑K
i=1 v
H
k
εi+
√
qd
Jo v
H
k
ε˜⋆
w
|αk} = (
∑K
i=1
pd(1+δ2i )βi
1+δ2
i
+τpt βi
+
qd
1+Jo )E{‖vk ‖
2 |αk}. The proof is complete
after simplifying E{‖vk ‖2 |αk} by using Wishart matrix properties [14, Lemma 2.10]. 
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Fig. 2: Sum-SE of the system versus the jamming powers qt = qd for M = 100, K = 1, τ = 3, pt = pd = 5 dB.
Remark 2. From (17), ρk → ∞ as M → ∞. This means that the jammer cannot dramatically
affect SE of the kth user when the system is equipped with the MMSE-JS estimator and ZFJS
detector.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We numerically evaluate the sum-SE of a system that exploits MMSE-JS and ZFJS during the
pilot and data phases, respectively. We consider T = 200 samples per coherence block and 105
independent runs for Monte-Carlo simulations. We normalize the large-scale fading coefficients
βi = βw = 1. Since the noise variance is previously normalized, the transmit powers can be
interpreted as the signal-to-noise ratios. Theorem 1 is used for implementation of the MMSE-JS
estimator.
Fig. 2 depicts how the sum-SE varies with respect to the jamming powers for M = 100,
K = 1, τ = 3, and pt = pd = 5 dB. The Monte-Carlo simulation of Lemma 2 matches the
closed-form expression in Corollary 1. Moreover, we compare the performance of the system
equipped with the MMSE-JS estimator and the ZFJS detector, to the system equipped with the
LMMSE estimator and the ZF-type detector proposed in [8]. The sum-SE of a system equipped
with the LMMSE estimator and MF detector is also illustrated to indicate the robustness level
of the proposed framework against jamming attacks. This figure shows that the sum-SE with the
proposed framework is substantially higher than in prior works. This happens since MMSE-JS
decreases the pilot contamination caused by the jammer, while ZFJS exploits both the estimated
user channels and the estimated channel of the jammer to detect the users’ data symbols.
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Fig. 3: Sum-SE of the system versus the number of BS antennas for K = 2, τ ∈ {3, 4, 5}, and pt = pd = qt = qd = 2 dB.
In Fig. 3, the sum-SE is shown in terms of the number of BS antennas for K = 2, τ ∈ {3, 4, 5},
and pt = pd = qt = qd = 2 dB. We can see that the performance of the system improves when
the number of pilots increases. This is because y1¯, y2¯, and yo in MMSE-JS can be selected to be
different for larger τ, therefore the correlation of the estimated channels decreases. For example
for τ = 5, we have three unused pilot signals, therefore each of them is selected as one of
the signals y1¯, y2¯, and yo, subsequently the estimated channels are uncorrelated. We know that
the linear detectors (like the ZFJS) perform better as the correlation of the estimated channels
reduces.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a framework was proposed to mitigate jamming during the uplink transmission
of mMIMO systems. The proposed framework exploits the new MMSE-JS estimator and the
ZFJS detector during the pilot and data phases, respectively. MMSE-JS uses unused pilots to
reduce the pilot contamination caused by the jammer. ZFJS suppresses the jamming interference
from the received signals at the BS during the data phase. Our analysis shows that the mMIMO
system equipped with MMSE-JS and ZFJS is robust against jamming attacks even with strong
jamming powers.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Based on vH
k
yd (vk is the kth column of matrix V and yd is the received vector in (3)), an
achievable SE of the kth user is [1, Sec. 2.3.5]
Sk =
(
1 − τ
T
)
E
{
log2 (1 + ρk)
}
, (18)
where the effective SINR of the kth user, ρk , is obtained as
ρk =
pd
E {vHk hk α(U)k }2
pd
∑K
i=1 E
{vH
k
hi
2 α(U)k } − pd E {vHk hk α(U)k }2 + qdE {vHk hw 2 α(U)k } + E {‖vk ‖2 α(U)k } .
(19)
The expectations in (19) are computed by assuming the MF detector at the BS, i.e., vk = hˆk , in
closed form as follows:
E
{
hˆHk hk
α(U)
k
}
= BM
(
1 + τqt E
{α(U)
k
2} βw + τpt βk ) , (20)
E
{hˆHk hi2 α(U)k } = { BM
(
τpt Mβ
2
k
+ βk
(
1 + τqt
α(U)
k
2 βw + τptβk )) , i = k
BMβi
(
1 + τqt
α(U)k 2 βw + τptβk ) , i , k , (21)
E
{hˆHk hw 2 α(U)k } = BM (τqt α(U)k 2 Mβ2w + βw (1 + τqt α(U)k 2 βw + τpt βk )) , (22)
E
{hˆk2 α(U)k } = BM (1 + τqt α(U)k 2 βw + τpt βk ) , (23)
where B = τptβ
2
k
/(1 + τqt E{|α(U)k |2}βw + τptβk)2. Regarding the computations in (20)−(23),
two terms with scaling factor M2 remain in ρk which are related to the desired channel and the
jammer’s interference, while the other terms scale as M . Hence, we have
ρ
(asy)
k
=
pt pdβ
2
k
qtqd
α(U)k 2 β2w as M →∞. (24)
The limit in (24) is also achievable for ZF and MMSE detectors [10, Proposition 5].
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
To prove (12), we have
‖yi‖2
M
=
1
M
(√
τqtαihw + ni
)H (√
τqtαihw + ni
)
, (25)
according (8). There exist four terms in (25), where two of them tend to zero as M → ∞, i.e.,
hHw ni
M
=
nH
i
hw
M
= 0, and the terms τqt |αi |2 ‖hw ‖
2
M
= Ji , ‖ni ‖
2
M
= 1. For finite M , it can happen that
‖yi ‖2
M
< 1, but then the pilot jamming attack is negligible. Hence, the negative values of Ji in
(12) are ignored and replaced by zero. Furthermore, δk in (13) is obtained analogous to the proof
of Ji. To prove (14), following from (8), (10), and the asymptotic behaviour of the mMIMO
systems, all terms in
yH
k¯
yk
M
tend to zero except
yH
k¯
yk
M
= τqt
αkαk¯  e jθk ‖hw ‖2M = τqt αkαk¯  βwe jθk . (26)
We can see that the angle of
yH
k¯
yk
M
tends to θk as M → ∞.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
An achievable SE of the kth user is obtained [1, Section 2.3.5] as Sk = (1 − τT )E{log2(1 +
pd | E{vHk hk |αk}|2
Var{n˜k |αk} )}, by the side information αk , where the desired signal is received over E{v
H
k
hk |αk}
and the other terms in vH
k
yd are the effective noise n˜k . Plugging the ZFJS, i.e., v
H
k
hi =
{
1, i = k
0, i , k
,
into Sk and since nd is independent of the channels, we obtain Sk as (15).
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